Insights: E-Reads and
Articles on Decision Making
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It
Takes Three to Make Good Estimates
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Reading time: |
app. 20
min. |
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Summary: |
3-point
estimation assumes that there is uncertainty
on costs, efforts and duration.
This uncertainty can not be handled by the
traditional single estimation point. |
The Secrets of Net Present Value Projection
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Reading time: |
app. 40min. |
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Summary: |
Net Present
Value forecasts are among the most common
techniques of investment / project selection
against constraints like budgets or other
resources. |
Is the AD
Team Role Destructive?
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Reading time: |
app.15min. |
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Summary: |
The role of the Advocatus
Diaboli, the Devil's Advocate, is often seen as
restraining and destructive.
Looking at the risks of group decisions, it
is probably one of the most important team roles. |
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The Abilene Paradox
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Reading time: |
app. 15min. |
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Summary: |
Instead of
improving decision making, too much respect and
regardfulness may lead to poor decisions when
ruling is done by a committee. |
Project Selection - a Pitfall
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Reading time: |
app. 5min. |
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Summary: |
Ensuring that the
right project portfolio is selected and that
work will be done in the right order, with
appropriate priorities and with objectives
aligned with the corporate objectives ensures
that the best is made from the resources
available. |
The Sunk Cost Dilemma
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Reading time: |
app. 25min. |
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Summary: |
The Sunk Cost Dilemma describes a game theory
situation in a 1-player game, where the sum of a
sequence of good decisions is one big bad
decision. |
The Creeping Scope
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Reading time: |
app. 25min. |
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Summary: |
While project
documentation is incomplete from the start,
there is a tendency that it will also differ
from the work actually done. This deviation is
further growing the nearer the project comes to
its end.
How can one overcome this dilemma? |
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| Executive summary: |
| The Sunk Cost Dilemma describes
a game theory situation in a 1-player game, where
the sum of a sequence of good decisions, each
yielding a positive payoff, may be one big
bad decision - a loss. |
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The
Sunk Cost Dilemma
1-player game theory helps understanding why projects run into troubles
By
Oliver F. Lehmann, PMPSome background on game theory
The findings of Game Theory have often
been found helpful for the description of business situations in which individuals or groups have interests which are contrary to
those of a group to which they belong. The following example
describes a situation where a dominant strategy leads to a dilemma
without such a conflict of interests.
Games are defined as follows:
A game consists of a set of players, a set of moves (or
strategies) available to those players, and a specification of
payoffs for each combination of strategies.
(see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory)
Depending on the number of players, a game may be
categorized in one of three types:
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Type |
Some examples |
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1) |
1-player games: |
Jigsaw puzzles, Sudoku, Solitaire, Rubik’s Cube, slot
machines, most computer games, many extreme sports like
hiking1,... |
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2) |
2-player games: |
Tug of war2, chess,
dame, football matches2,
tennis, 2-fighter sports of all kinds,... |
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3) |
n-player games:
(for n>2) |
Races of all kinds, field athletics, golf, football
tournaments2, Ludo,
Poker,...
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A big "Thank you" to Dr. Charlotte Werthemann from Zurich, Switzerland, a
game-theory and hiking maniac who made
me aware of how much the 1-player concept applies to her sport in which the
decision of going on or quitting half-way to the peak is being made moment by moment
and the decision yield may be survival. |
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Each team being a player in a match. |
2- and n-player games may be simultaneous
(one match at a time) or sequential (the game is made by consecutive
moves). They are by nature
competitive and the motivation of a player is that to win.
1-player games are always sequential. These
games are characterized by the player's desire to
meet a set of objectives. The motivation to play is achievement3
or reward for achievement.
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David C. McClelland has done extensive research on
motivation by achievement. A short introduction into his
work can be found
here. |
Very much simplified, one may say that
Game Theory for 2-player games has been
described by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944,
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University
Press).
n-player games have been described by John Nash in his
dissertation Non-cooperative games (1950) with the
invention of the Nash Equilibrium. A similar approach
could be found in the article The Tragedy of the Commons by
Garrett Hardin (1968).
To the author's understanding is this document, which has been
originally published on 12 May 2006, the first approach to describe
game theory for 1-player games.
The approach
Another situation will be described here: It
is a common dilemma situation which applies to project management
and may be described as the Sunk Cost Dilemma.
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Decision 1: |
good |
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Decision 2: |
good |
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... |
| Decision n: |
good |
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| Overall result: |
bad |
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It can be seen
as a one-player game in which a single player (which may be a group
which in our context is not characterized by internal competition)
makes a number of consecutive moves like in the card game
Solitaire (or Patience) or in the game called Rubik’s
cube which was popular around the world in the early 1980ies.
The Sunk Cost Dilemma can apply to any game
with 1 player and n moves (n>1). The player calculates and optimizes
before each move which option out of a set of two or more
options is the best and implements this option, but finds at the end
that the sum of a sequence of optimal decisions may be that of one big
bad decision.
The Sunk Cost Dilemma is different from Repeated Games in that it applies a 1-player approach whereas
Repeated Games are played by two players.
The following case study will show that
linear elements (running costs of a project) can add to a Sunk Cost
Dilemma situation as well as non-linear elements (incentive payment,
liquidated damages).
Definitions
Sunk costs
The term sunk costs is being used here
as a descriptor for cost amounts which are no more under control,
i.e. they are no more open to decision making. They can not be
rejected, reduced or recovered because they have
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already and definitively been paid to other
parties, or
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have been validly invoiced or charged and
the invoices or charges will definitively have to be paid in
near future, or
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have not yet been invoiced or charged but
the invoices or charges are expected to come in in the
foreseeable future, the amounts are already known and the
payments will have to be settled soon after the invoices or
charges have been received.
Sunk costs may differ from Actual
costs which at least relate to payments already made. Actual
costs may also include valid invoices which are already due to be
paid, but should not include expected invoices or payments. Actual
costs relate to actual status of payments while Sunk costs relates
to decision making. If a payment can be validly recollected e.g. by
applying legal measures, than these may still be actual costs before
the re-imbursement has been actually made, but would not been
perceived as Sunk costs.
Sunk costs may include
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indirect costs – costs for overheads, costs
to maintain the production and the performing organization;
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direct costs – costs for input materials for
production processes which are directly related to the scope of
work.
Sunk costs will be typically calculated using
monetary metric, but may also be shown in resource working time,
availability time of human/equipment type resources, or in materials
consumed. Other metrics like scrap produced or environmental damage
occurred could also be thought of.
Dilemma
A dilemma is a situation with an
uncontrollable tendency towards some kind of disaster. It may be
unforeseeable or even foreseeable, in the latter case the term
tragedy is sometimes applied too.
Uncontrollable does not necessarily mean that
the tools are not present to avoid the disaster. It may not be in
the single and most immediate interest of each player or of most of
the players to avoid the disaster.
In many cases, foreseeability therefore does
not change the general characteristic of uncontrollability of a
dilemma.
A case study
The upfront situation
The company Global Project Solutions Inc.
(GPS) is in negotiations to run a project for another firm called
HAL Inc. which includes building and implementing a piece of
industrial production equipment which will be made of different
types of hardware and software. In order to secure the buyer from
cost risks, the contract offered was a fixed price contract with a
price tag at $1,000,000.
The equipment will be mostly made from
standard components, but there will be some customization necessary
which will be agreed upon as soon as both the customer and the
contractor have a sufficient understanding about the details of the
customization.
The customer also proposed to pay an
incentive fee in case that the contractor would be able to meet a
more aggressive delivery date. Global Project Solutions Inc. estimated
that a time of nine months would be sufficient to finish and hand
over the equipment, but they would receive an additional payment of
$150,000 in case they succeed in doing the handover before the end
of the 7th month.
According to a requirement brought up by the
customer, a term for liquidated damages4 of $200,000 has also become part of
the proposal in case that Global Project Solution would cancel the
contract before all work has been finished. The same payment would apply if the customer can
prove that the contractor is unable to finish the project from
technical, organizational or funding reasons.
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Continental Europeans and other readers from countries
with Civil Law jurisdictions would
use contractual penalties instead of liquidated damages
used in Common Law countries. For the case study, this would
have the same effect . |
The project should start immediately after
the contract has been signed off by both parties. The customer has
already signed the contract, now the contractor has to confirm the
order with the signature under the contract.
Decision 1:
The Pre-sales department at Global Project
Solutions Inc. has made some rough estimates and calculations. They
assume that
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the nine month estimate on duration is
perfectly reasonable,
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with the additional amount available from
the incentive payment, they
should be able to speed up the project and achieve handover in
less than seven months and therefore in time for the incentive,
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the company’s command of their own
technology is good enough to feel sure that the project can be
finished and that the company will not want to step back from
the contract before the customer’s requirements will be Fully
met.
The Pre-sales department calculated own costs
to build the equipment at $800,000. A fast-track project plan to
schedule handover during the 7th month would be feasible
at $900,000.
The first decision would include three
options:
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*: Would
include incentive payment to the
contractor
As there are no opportunity costs – other
projects which can not be started because of this project and which
would gain a higher profit – the best decision is to begin the
project and go for the fast-tracked option. This decision has the
highest yield.
GPS signs the contract with HAL Inc. and
immediately begins with work on the project.
Decision 2:
Some days before the second month has been
finished—a project manager had been assigned and a core team been
built during that time, also some first work had been done—the first
valid project schedule could be finished and was ready for
acceptance by the management of GPS and by the customer too.
During that time some underestimated
difficulties related to customization came up: Some standard
components normally used by GPS have been found incompatible with
interfaces at the customer’s site and need to be replaced with
custom made parts.
The sunk costs – invoices already paid, open
invoices and expected invoices plus internal charges from other
departments – are already adding up at $100,000, after 40,000 at the
end of the first month.
The new handmade parts will increase the
overall total cost estimate by 10%. An additional payment of $10,000
will be paid to subcontractors as an incentive if they can speed up
their production and deliver the components before the end of the 4th
month. This adds up to a cost increase of $100,000.
Urgent meetings were held at the end of the
second project month in order to decide whether the company GPS
should go on with the project or inform the customer that they would
withdraw and pay the liquidated damages.
During these meetings the discussion
concentrated on a decision value: How much of the costs are still
open for decision making and what is the payment from the customer
related to these decisions?
The decision at the end of month 2 looks like
this (grey background signals options): |
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*: Would
include additional costs and incentive payments to subcontractors.
**: For liquidated damages.
The decision to proceed is more attractive
than the decision to cancel the project, its yield is $450,000
better and so is its profit. The best decision is to go on with the
project, and this decision is being made.
Decision 3:
End of the 3rd month, the project
seemed quite on track. Progress was fine and another $80,000 have
been sunk. As everything goes fine, no new estimate for the rest of
the project has been made.
End of the 4th month, a major
audit was being planned. The additional components have been
delivered and the progress overall seemed fine too. Costs at a
total value of $390,000 have been produced and the cost estimates of
the project seem still reasonable. The decision to proceed was easy
looking at the numbers:
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Decision 4:
End of the fifth month came with a bad
surprise: The custom made components fit perfectly to the interfaces
at the customer’s site, bit were difficult to integrate with the
plant made by GPS. Some further adaptations have become necessary
which will cost another $20,000 and will take over a month. This
would make it impossible to adhere to the 7th month for
handover and to get the incentive payment. An additional payment of
$80,000 could speed up the adaptations to have them finished during
the 6th month.
Regular project progress consumed another
$200,000 and besides of the problem with the handmade components
everything is well on track.
There are again three options for decision 4:
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*: Would
include another $20,000 for adaptations
**: Would include another $100,000 for adaptations
+: Would no more include incentive payment
The second option looks best. A decision to
control $510,000 results in $1,150,000 income. There is still a—very
small—profit.
Still a chance to take.
Decision 5:
During the sixth month it became clear that
the additional payments will not be sufficient to get the additional
components reworked in time. The project can no more be finished by
the end of the seventh month and the incentive will not be granted
by the customer.
The project manager got under pressure from
the management which she passed over to the team The project got
further derailed regarding time and costs. Another $200,000 have
been sunk, but progress slowed down and open costs had to be
re-estimated $250,000 higher than expected the month before.
At the end of the sixth month, there were two
options for decision 5:
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*: Does no more
include incentive payment
Even the loss which came up leaves it more
interesting to proceed, the sunk costs would add too the losses
incurred with both decisions and proceeding is still more
attractive because it has the highest yield.
The way to the project finish:
The project was finished just in time,
towards the end of the ninth month which made the customer very
happy. For the contractor, the numbers looked much more unfriendly,
more additional costs have been caused by the project team which
felt pressurized and had lost convenience while the GPS management
had to make more funding available to adhere to the contract:
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Instead of making a profit of $250,000, the
project made a loss of $500,000.
The sum of five decisions, each of them
perfectly yield-optimized for a project business owner’s profit, has been
a bad decision.
At the beginning, the contractor had the
option to not run the project—at least not using the aggressive
approach—and later on had the opportunity to terminate the project
at least four times. But the longer the project took, the harder it
got for the contractor to opt out. The longer a project goes, the
more likely it is that it will be finished, even when it runs into a
loss.
The decision yield—how much profit can I make
from now on and how much do I have to invest right now?—did increase
over most of the lifecycle. Each single decision had a positive
yield, but while this yield got even higher, the sum of all these
decisions has become a loss.

Analysis
Nash equilibrium and Sunk-cost equilibrium
Is there a set of dominant strategies in a Sunk Cost
Dilemma situation, similar to those constituting the Nash Equilibrium in an n-player
game?
As the single decisions are made to maximize single decision
yields, the dominant strategy for each single decision in the
example has been "yes - go
on". And similar to the Nash equilibrium, optimized single decisions
did not lead to a positive total.
The Nash equilibrium occurs in a mixed
cooperative/competitive situation. The Sunk-cost equilibrium is the
outcome of a learning process in combination with increasing sunk
costs—costs that are no more under control, but add to total costs.
The growing knowledge comes together with reduced influence.
From the third decision on, terminating the
project would even have created a higher loss than the final loss of the
entire project. But one would know this only from hind side...
Nash equilibrium contradicted Adam Smith's theory of the
"invisible hand". Sunk-cost equilibrium contradicts the common sense
expectation that if every decision is a good decision by itself, the
outcome must be that people are doing the right thing.
Warning Signs
Are there any early warning signs that a
project—or maybe even an entire project portfolio—may be heading to
a total loss even when individual decisions are right?
One should be careful if the following has
been found:
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High risks linked to a date or another non-linear
element (like the incentive fee in the example) are a common element
of the Sunk Cost Dilemma. “Almost meeting” such a target can mean
that additional costs have been incurred but there will be no
pay-off for that.
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Three-point estimation may have shown that the risks
are high and that the likeliness of not making a profit is high. In
the example, a one-point estimation approach has been used, which
hides the risks behind the assumptions.
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Early identification of constraints may have been
helpful too. In the case study, it may have been possible to take
care earlier what happens if the new system does not fit to the
customer’s legacies.
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Trend analysis may sometimes be helpful too as it
shows a tendency of a learning curve following behind the money
burning curve instead of running ahead of it—what the Sunk Cost
Dilemma actually is.
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Low-margin and fast paced projects are far more at
risk than high-margin projects. The risk of running into the Sunk
Cost Dilemma grows with decreasing margins and reduced execution
time.
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Existence of incomplete contracts.
Incomplete contracts5 seem to be
generally unavoidable, according to recent research of Contract
Theory.
An incomplete contract increases the risk of running into the
Sunk Cost Dilemma because costs for the contractor may become
visible only late, when the contract is getting more and more
complete, i.e. showing customer's assumptions and expectations.
Contracts and related documents like CSOWs6, CWBSs7, Scope statements etc. should be meticulously
investigated for the risk of a Sunk Cost Dilemma.
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acc. to Prof Oliver Hart: A contract characterized by an
approach “Agreeing now to agree later”, leaving details
open for later specification because it is yet not
possible to make all details clear or it is too
expensive to cover all possibilities, see
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/465.pdf. |
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CSOW: Contract Statement of Work |
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CWBS: Contract Work Breakdown Structure |
Vicious circles
The case study shows how the Sunk Cost Dilemma may
come with systemic vicious circles which can not be planned for but
may be identifiable when they occur:
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The project is behind schedule and over budget.
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The project manager gets pressurized by management.
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The project manager routes the pressure onto the team.
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The team is loosing confidence and communications are suffering.
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Interfaces cause extended troubles.
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Progress slows down and costs are soaring.
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The project gets further behind schedule and over budget.

Solutions
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1. |
A reporting and forecasting system which gives management
information in short cycles can help to perceive the risk of the
Sunk Cost Dilemma earlier. The reporting cycles should be
appropriate to the level of risk exposure. High risks – short
cycles. |
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2. |
A presentation and forecasting system which does not allow for inconsistencies
around a data date (status date, as-of date).

The Sunk Cost Dilemma is often a result of wrong presentation and interpretation of correct data.
The following example exists in reality. It shows a display solution used on shop
floor level in a manufacturing company and has been published in the company's
customer magazine: |
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Each row of bars represents activities done by one worker, green bars stand for
actual work, grey bars for remaining work. The display obviously places open work
left
from the data date (vertical red line), so that actual delays can not be
identified. Decisions based on such information must be wrong.
Remark: There is a "green" project traffic light in the staple notch
of the pages.
Some weeks after the photo has been published, the company had to publicly confirm that
the project for which the display is being used, has a delay of 1 year and
massive cost overruns. But the company will not stop the project... |
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3. |
Estimates must be documented together with all information regarding
their specific uncertainties. The more uncertain an estimate is, the
more care must be taken what the possible consequences of
underestimation are.
3-Point estimating is preferred! |
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4. |
The typical contract type when projects are performed under contract
is the open contract
It should be analyzed
which risks are related to contract incompleteness, these should be
managed pro-actively. |
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5. |
The roles in project teams are often not well defined. It may take a
while until project manager, project sponsor, team members and other
stakeholders know where their place is and for what they are
responsible and accountable. Unclear accountabilities are an
invitation to short estimates and to an ongoing Sunk Cost Dilemma. |
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6. |
Optimization for contingencies. An article on that topic is
currently being developed. |
Can Decision Trees help?
Yes they can.
Insight Tree supports three-point estimations and shows at the
right end of each branch the payoff: |
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The example above shows two decision options with different known
costs. Additional long term costs have been estimated by application
of 3-point estimation.
Option2 is more attractive with an EMV of -406,666,67 instead of
-586,666.67 for Option1 (see status bar). But Option2 has also a
much higher risk of total costs summing up to 920,000 in the worst
case instead of -720,000 for Option1.
One has to make sure that the process of data gathering and
estimating includes the worst cases data as well as data for the
other cases (most likely, optimistic). Decision should then be made
not only based on the most likely expectation but also on
overall risk exposure.
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